讲座题目：The Role of Charging Fee Regulation in the Adoption of Electric Vehicles充电费监管在电动汽车普及中的作用

主 讲 人：邵婧 对外经济贸易大学教授

讲座时间：2025年5月29日9：00——10：00

讲座地点：公司南路校区主教学楼 615

主 持 人：晏妮娜 伟德国际victor1946教授

主讲人介绍：

邵婧于加拿大不列颠哥伦比亚大学（UBC）获得管理科学博士学位， 现为对外经济贸易大学国际伟德国际victor1946企业管理系教授、博士生导师。邵婧主要从事供应链管理领域的研究，研究问题涵盖新能源汽车供应链、平台运营策略、绿色供应链等，第一作者论文发表于Manufacturing & Service Operations Management、Production and Operations Management、Decision Sciences、Transportation Research Part B、Transportation Research Part A、Journal of Transport Economics and Policy等期刊。讲授运营管理、供应链管理等课程。获北京市哲学社会科学优秀成果奖一等奖，以及教育部高等学校科学研究优秀成果奖二等奖。

讲座摘要：

Electric vehicles (EVs) present a promising solution to address environmental challenges in the transport sector. However, the adoption of EVs heavily relies on the development of charging infrastructure. In addition to subsidies for charging infrastructure, regulations on charging service fees are a common incentive for charging station deployment. We develop a game-theoretic model to examine the impact of charging fee regulations on the deployment of charging stations, EV adoption, and the interests of EV manufacturers, third-party charging service providers, and consumers. We show that regulators may not always need to reduce charging fees with a cap. Instead, increasing the charging fee with a floor may incentivize third-party companies to deploy more charging stations, benefiting consumers. This is particularly true when consumers are sensitive to the number of charging stations, or the cost of station installation is low. Conversely, when EV manufacturers deploy charging stations, regulators should consistently set a charging fee cap to intensify competition among EV manufacturers and enhance social welfare. Furthermore, while a charging station subsidy always encourages more charging stations and higher charging fees than either a charging fee cap or floor, regulating the charging fee can lead to higher social welfare than providing a subsidy. Moreover, a charging fee regulation may need to reduce the share of direct current fast charging (DCFC) to enhance welfare. Additionally, compared with EV manufacturers, a third-party company might deploy more charging stations, but EV manufacturers always deploy a greater share of DCFC than a third-party company.

中文摘要：

电动汽车为应对交通领域的环境挑战提供了一种前景广阔的解决方案。然而，电动汽车的普及很大程度上依赖于充电基础设施的发展。除充电基础设施补贴外，充电服务费监管是激励充电站建设的常用手段。我们通过构建博弈论模型，研究充电费监管对充电站建设、电动汽车普及以及电动汽车制造商、第三方充电服务商和消费者利益的影响。研究发现，监管机构未必总需要通过设置上限来降低充电费用。相反，设定充电费下限并允许提价，反而可能激励第三方企业建设更多充电站，最终使消费者受益——当消费者对充电站数量敏感，或充电站建设成本较低时，这一效应尤为显著。反之，当充电站由电动汽车制造商建设时，监管机构应始终设定充电费上限，以加剧制造商之间的竞争并提升社会福利。此外，虽然充电站补贴政策在促进充电站建设和提高充电费方面始终优于充电费上限或下限监管，但实施充电费监管可能比提供补贴带来更高的社会福利。值得注意的是，充电费监管可能需要降低直流快充占比以提升福利水平。研究还发现，与电动汽车制造商相比，第三方企业可能建设更多充电站，但制造商建设的直流快充占比始终高于第三方企业。